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Rio de Janeiro 2016  
Gabriel Silvestre 
 
As one enters the viewing platform of the Olympic Park at Barra da Tijuca, a bold statement is displayed 
ŽŶ ƚŚĞǁĂůůĂďŽǀĞ ƚŚĞďĂůĐŽŶǇ P  ‘dŚĞ'ĂŵĞƐŵƵƐƚ ƐĞƌǀĞ ƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ? ?dŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ĐƌĞĚŝƚĞĚ ƚŽ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ
Barcelona Mayor Pasqual Maragall whose quote Eduardo Paes, mayor of Rio de Janeiro, borrowed from, 
eager to equate the urban interventions for the 2016 Games with the wide-ranging transformation 
witnessed in the Catalan capital more than two decades ago. It is claimed that Rio is undergoing a 
watershed moment with mega-events propelling it to global city status (Paes, 2015). Expectations are at 
such a level that when Paes was confronted by a recent study showing marginal benefits for cities hosting 
mega-ĞǀĞŶƚƐƚŚĞĂŶƐǁĞƌǁĂƐďŽůĚ P ‘tĞǁŝůůůĞĂǀĞĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂŝŶƚŚĞĚƵƐƚ ? ?&ĞƌŶĂŶĚĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
ŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶƐĂƐŝĚĞ ?ŝƚŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůƚŽŚŽůĚŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŵĂǇŽƌ ?ƐƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƚŽĂƐŬ PŚŽǁĂƌĞƚŚĞ'ĂŵĞƐƐĞƌǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ
city? What kind of transformations are being induced by the mega-event? For that, it is important to 
examine how the Olympic moment translates into changes and continuities of the developmental 
ƚƌĂũĞĐƚŽƌǇŽĨZŝŽĚĞ:ĂŶĞŝƌŽ ?dŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇŽĨZŝŽ ?ƐŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŝƐŽĨƚĞŶƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚŝŶďŝŶĂƌǇƚĞƌŵƐ PƚŚĞ
ŚŝůůƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂƐƉŚĂůƚ ? ? ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĂů ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ? ƚŚĞ EŽƌƚŚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ^Žuth Ends. How does the 
preparation for the 2016 Games relate to these dichotomies? 
This chapter offers an overview ŽĨZŝŽĚĞ:ĂŶĞŝƌŽ ?ƐƉĂƐƚ ?ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ĂŶĚĂ preliminary 
discussion of the legacies that will be left by the event. The first part charts the history of urban change, 
events and mega-projects that have shaped the development of the city. The second examines the 
different Olympic bids the city has prepared in the last two decades followed by an analysis of the 
preparations and their impacts six years after the Olympic nomination. Finally, the conclusion attempts 
to answer the questions posed with one year still to go before the start of the Olympics. 
 
From the belle époque to the era of mega-events  
Francisco Pereira Passos is another political figure that Eduardo Paes is keen to be associated with¹. Mayor 
of Rio de Janeiro between 1902 and 1906 he is credited with ƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞƐĂůĞƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨZŝŽ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂů
area, a feat likened to that of Baron ,ĂƵƐƐŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ 'ƌĞĂƚ tŽƌŬƐ ŽĨ WĂƌŝƐ that served as its model 
(Benchimol, 1990) ?dŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĚĞŶƐĞůǇƉŽƉƵůĂƚĞĚCentro, experienced a frenetic and profound program of 
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ǁŽƌŬƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞŐŽĂůŽĨ  ‘civilizing ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞŵďĞůůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞǁƌĂǌŝů ? ?ďǇƚŚĞŶĂ
young republic and tŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞƐƚĐŽĨĨĞĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůƚƌĂŝƚƐŽĨĂŵŽĚĞƌŶ
and cosmopolitan city (Abreu, 2008). In material terms that meant overcoming the colonial character of 
the city with its narrow and dank roads that conferred the aspect of a large Portuguese village. Therefore, 
the program of works envisaged the modernization of the city port (actually undertaken by the federal 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ǀŝƚĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂŶĚƚŽŬĞĞƉƵƉǁŝƚŚƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƵĞŶŽƐŝƌĞƐ
and Montevideo; the opening up of new thoroughfares to regulate the traffic flow; and the upgrading of 
the utilities infrastructure. Culturally, it oversaw the construction of a host of institutional buildings of 
eclectic European architecture, plazas and promenades ?ǁŚŝůĞ ƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ  ‘ƵŶĐŝǀŝůŝǌĞĚĐƵƐƚŽŵƐ ? ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
carnival celebrations, street hawking and stray dogs (Needell, 1987). Crowning such transformation was 
the construction of Avenida Central (now Avenida Rio Branco) a Paris-inspired boulevard with cafés and 
tea houses, an opera house, national library and other civic institutions. Coupled with a hygienist 
justification, Passos ?Ɛ bulldozing efforts saw the demolition of hundreds of tenement houses, home to 
many urban poor composed by freed slaves, migrants and immigrants, attracted by the proximity to 
labour opportunities. A consequence of this action was the displacement of thousands of poor residents 
to more distant neighbourhoods served by the railway or to precarious self-built homes on the hills near 
the city centre. The increasing formation of so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘favelas ? by 1916 was such that a local magazine 
called for a  ‘ƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐĐĞŶƐŽƌƐŚŝƉ ? of ƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƌĂƐŝƚŝĐŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚƐŽĨƚŚĞŚŝůůƐ ? ƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞ ‘wrecking with 
their sordid existence the efforts made to dot the capital of Brazil with the magnificent aspects of a great 
ŵĞƚƌŽƉŽůŝƐ ? (Revista da Semana in Abreu, 2008:89). 
  
Figure 1. Avenida Central with its influence from mid-19th century Paris epitomised the urban 
interventions that marked Rio de Janeiro ?Ɛ belle époque (Acervo AGCRJ). 
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In the first quarter of the 20th century two vectors of urban development that socially and spatially 
stratified the city had matured (Abreu, 2008). One followed the coastline south of the centre led by the 
opening of tramways to the wealthy neighbourhoods of Glória and Botafogo, where the elite built their 
airy and large mansions, and well across the hills into Copacabana, Ipanema and Leblon, where urban Rio 
found its beach identity  ?K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?. The other vector followed north from Centro, along the rail 
lines departing from Central do Brasil station toward industrial and rural districts such as Engenho de 
Dentro and Deodoro, and into the Baixada Fluminense region. Rio was quickly evolving into a teeming 
metropolis reaching a population of more than one million in 1920 and more than doubling that figure 
after the World War II (Abreu, 2008). 
The federal capital continued to be selectively transformed by grand projects. The levelling of Castelo Hill 
in 1922 was justified on the grounds of improving air circulation and hygiene while also opening a prime 
piece of land in the city centre by ĚŝƐůŽĚŐŝŶŐ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞƐ ? (Kessel, 2001). Its urgency was due to the 
hosting of the International Exposition celebrating ƌĂǌŝů ?Ɛcentenary as an independent state with 
temporary pavilions erected on the cleared grounds. The earth removed served to enlarge by landfill the 
sea shore thus creating the neighbourhood of Urca and shrinking the size of Rodrigo de Freitas lagoon. By 
the mid-20th century Rio had become an exotic international destination with visits from Hollywood stars 
and serving as a movie set for the shooting of musicals  ?K ?ŽŶŶĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?. 
The increasing complexity of metropolitan Rio during the dictatorship period (1962-1984) was translated 
ŝŶĂ ‘ŚŝŐŚǁĂǇĨĞǀĞƌ ? ?ďƌĞƵ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚĞǆĐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞǁƌŽĂĚƐ ?ƚƵŶŶĞůƐĂŶĚĨůǇ-overs such 
as the Perimetral elevated expressway over the port area; the Aterro do Flamengo expressway facilitating 
the traffic flow between Centro and the South End; and the cross bay Rio-Niteroi bridge. However, these 
works were testimony to the beginning of the slow political and economic decline of the city with the 
construction of Brasilia as the new federal capital, which meant not only a loss of status but also the 
departure of important elements of the city economy. Amidst the global economic crisis, Brazil reached 
the 1980s with an unsustainable level of external debt and contracted growth. Structural adjustment 
programmes conditioned by the loans from multi-lateral institutions further increased levels of poverty 
and unemployment. Crime levels soared in Rio while organized armed groups started to take control of 
the favelas as base for their illicit activities. dŚĞZŝŽĚĞ:ĂŶĞŝƌŽŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ůŽƐƚĚĞĐĂĚĞƐ ?ŽĨ ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚ ? ? ? Ɛ
still attracted world-wide attention. This time, rather that the scenes of international celebrities frolicking 
on the sands of Copacabana it was the execution of homeless children at Candelária and unarmed civilians 
at Vigário Geral that captured international headlines. Some of the business elite left the city afraid of the 
wave of kidnappings while companies transferred their activities to other cities. The urban space became 
increasingly fortified with the walls and surveillance cameras to secure residences, offices and commerce. 
dŚĞ ďŽŽŵŝŶŐ ĂƌĞĂ ŽĨ ĂƌƌĂ ĚĂ dŝũƵĐĂ ? ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ƵƌďĂŶ ĨƌŽŶƚŝĞƌĨŽƌ ZŝŽ ?Ɛupper and middle classes, 
epitomized the increasing spatial segregation of the city with exclusive enclaves of gated communities, 
shopping malls and express ways. In retrospect, it is difficult to imagine that an Olympic candidature could 
emerge in such adverse conditions. However, it was precisely the seductive idea of an urban turnaround 
promoted by a former host city that would motivate the Rio Olympic project.  
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Serial bidding  
From the mid-1990s Rio de Janeiro bid three times to host the Olympic Games and went to great lengths 
to host the 2007 Pan American Games as a way to boost its hosting credentials. The bidding for the mega-
event took place at a time of the redefinition of urban politics and as an outcome of international policy 
exchange, appreciated for its strategic use to leverage urban development and to redefine the city image. 
The process of Olympic bidding was thus influenced by two movements. One has its place in the City Hall 
in the redefinition of urban and planning policies where contact with the experience of Barcelona 
motivated the 2004 bid. The other has its place in the Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) where the 
ascendancy of a new chairman was intimately linked to the quest to bring the Olympics to Rio. 
The 2004 Olympic bid and the Barcelona connection 
dŚĞŽƌŝŐŝŶŽĨZŝŽĚĞ:ĂŶĞŝƌŽ ?ƐKůǇŵƉŝĐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ůŝĞƐ ŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĂƚ ƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ 
municipality and Barcelona during the 1990s (Silvestre, 2012). Fresh from hosting the 1992 Games that 
ŚĞůƉĞĚƚŽ ‘ƉƵƚƚŚĞĐŝƚǇŽŶƚŚĞŵĂƉ ?ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĂ ?ƐĐŝƚǇŚĂůůƵŶĚĞƌƚŽŽŬĂƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐƚŽƚĂŬĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌofile (Borja, 1996). Among these was the offering of consultancy 
services in public management targeting Latin America as a key market (Associació Pla Estratègic 
Barcelona 2000, 1994). Promoted by the municipal department of international relations, Catalan 
policymakers and companies were soon advising local governments in areas such as traffic engineering, 
waste collection and water management. However, it would be in the assistance for the elaboration of 
strategic plans that a greater market was found and in Rio de Janeiro their most challenging project. 
The 1992 municipal elections in Rio saw the victory of Cesar Maia, a former left-wing federal deputy who 
found space in the more conservative spectrum running for the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party 
(PMDB). Maia was keen to develop his image as conciliation between the technocrat and the politician, 
forming a cabinet of specialists and looking for new methods to bring efficiency to public management 
(Novais, 2010). Interested in the concept of strategic planning he was advised by his secretary of urbanism 
Luiz Paulo Conde, an architecture scholar with professional links with Barcelona, to listen to the proposal 
of the Catalan policymakers who were subsequently hired. According to the consultancy brief, the goal of 
the strategic plan was to 
set a vision for Rio de Janeiro  W a competitive city integrated to international life  W where it is 
assured for its population the full exercise of their citizenship. This vision will include a range of 
macro-economic, social, urban, cultural and environmental infrastructure projects that will 
define the development of the city in the next decade. The strategic plan will define a frame able 
to integrate all these macro-projects in a coherent manner (PCRJ, 1993:4) 
Elaborated between 1993 and 1995 the plan set a central objective² underpinned by strategies, objectives 
and activities to be implemented by policies and projects. A key element of the strategic plan was the bid 
to host the 2004 Olympic Games by virtue of establiƐŚŝŶŐ ‘ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐǁŝƚŚĨŝǆĞĚĚĞĂĚůŝŶĞƐĂŶĚĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽŶŝƚƐ
ŝŵĂŐĞĂƚŚŽŵĞĂŶĚĂďƌŽĂĚ ?ƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?(PCRJ, 
1996:25). The idea was born out of the exchange between Rio political leaders and the Catalan 
consultants, who extolled the experience of the 1992 Games in leveraging funding to development 
projects and in city marketing. A new team of consultants was formed bringing the expertise of the 
planners of the 1992 Games headed by architect Lluis Millet, responsible for the master plan and 
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infrastructural projects of the Barcelona Olympics. Working frantically during the second half of 1995, 
Millet proposed to adapt the underlying principle of territorial balance that informed his plan for the 
Barcelona Games by distributing Olympic clusters in the four quadrants of the city: North, South, West 
and Barra. The urban interventions in each cluster were expected to stimulate trickle-down effects in the 
ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐĂƌĞĂƐĂŶĚƚŚƵƐĞŶĐŽŵƉĂƐƐŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐƵƌďĂŶ space (RBC, 1996). The centerpiece of his 
proposal was the Olympic Park cluster in the Fundão /ƐůĂŶĚůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐEŽƌƚŚŶĚ ?ŚŽŵĞƚŽƚŚĞ
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. The university campus offered the advantages of being located next 
to the international airport and important expressways, while facilitating security and having abundant 
vacant land for the construction of Olympic facilities. It was proposed to change the isolated character of 
ƚŚĞŝƐůĂŶĚŝŶƚŽĂŶ ‘ĂƌĞĂŽĨŶĞǁĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ďǇ ‘ŽƉĞŶŝŶŐ ?ŝƚƵƉƚŽƚŚĞĐŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ
park, private housing, convention centre and a new linear park on over five kilometers of seafront (Rio 
Bid Committee, 1996:24).  
DŝůůĞƚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůĚŝǀŝĚĞĚŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞďŝĚĚŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?On one side was Conde 
and representatives of the federal government, who were supportive of the plan. On the other was Maia 
and Carlos Nuzman, president of BOC, advocating the use of Barra as main stage for the Games. In the 
ĞŶĚ ?DŝůůĞƚ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂů prevailed and the bid book was submitted to the IOC. The official candidature of 
Rio captured public imagination attracting one million people to Copacabana beach in support of the bid 
ŽŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŽĨ/K ?ƐĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞcities shortlisted to the second and final phase (Montenegro 
and Bahiense, 1997). Their hopes ended prematurely as Rio was left out of the final round of voting that 
included Athens, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Rome and Stockholm. 
The 2012 Olympic bid and the hosting of the 2007 Pan American Games 
In the aftermath of the IOC shortlist decision newspapers searched for the reasons to blame for the failure 
of the 2004 bid. It included the inexperience of the bid committee; the weak promotional strategy; the 
feasibility of the cleaning program for the Guanabara Bay that surrounded Fundão Island; the 
undeveloped transport and telecommunications infrastructure of the city; and the strong political 
character of the bid (Anon, 1997; Ventura and Araújo, 1997). Political motivation was understood to have 
jeopardized the governance of the bid and the nature of the proposed urban interventions. Federal 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂĐƚŽƌƐƚŽŽŬĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƐŝĚĞůŝŶĞĚƚŚĞŵĂǇŽƌĂŶĚƚŚĞK ?ƐƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?dŚĞ
absence of the mayor during the visit of the IOC Evaluation Commission and the marginal role of BOC did 
ŶŽƚŚĞůƉƚŽďŽŽƐƚZŝŽ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐ ?Euzman expressed complaints about KďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƵƐĞĚ ?ĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ
 ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŐƌĞĂƚƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶǁŚĞŶƚŚĞ ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůKůǇŵƉŝĐ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞŽŶĞůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇ ?ǁŚĞŶ
ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŝŶƚŚĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚƵƌĞ ? ?Varsano and Bittencourt, 1997). Finally, the discourse of 
using the event to improve the material conditions of deprived areas around Fundão Olympic Park was 
ƐĞĞŶĂƐŵŽƌĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚƚŚĂŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐƚŽƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƐƚŽĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞ/KŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?&ŽƌDĂŝĂ: 
submitting a city for the Olympics means taking the best features of the municipality and offering 
ƚŚĞŵƚŽƚŚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůKůǇŵƉŝĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ?ZŝŽĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽŝŶƐŝƐƚŽŶƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨĂŶKůǇŵƉŝĐƐ
for the city, hoping that the Games would serve to promote urban and social reforms. It is an 
appealing strategy but also very risky (Ventura and Araújo, 1997:C6). 
A subsequent bid for the 2008 Games was speculated about but never progressed. Instead Nuzman and 
Maia assumed the Olympic project and completely redesigned the general proposals. According to 
EƵǌŵĂŶ  ‘ ?ƚ ?ŚĞ ZŝŽ  ? ? ? ? ĚĞďĂĐůĞ ƐĞƌǀĞĚ ƚŽ ĚĞĨŝŶĞ Ă ŶĞǁ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?(Anon, 2002) centred on two key 
foundations. First was to move the centre of the Olympic master plan to booming Barra da Tijuca. 
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The choice of Barra is very important. During the Olympic candidature for 2004, Mayor Cesar Maia 
and I were against the choice of Fundão. The preference for Barra is due to the more available 
space... At Barra it is possible to build 70% to 80% of the Olympic facilities. The mayor Cesar Maia 
had the vision in thinking of Barra and in areas such as the racetrack near Riocentro. There is space 
to build a permanent sports park. I believe the racetrack is underused. The Formula 1 is now in 
São Paulo. Brazil has other important racetracks in Paraná, Goiás and Brasília. So, Brazil does not 
have enough auto and motorcycle racing competitions to justify this. This racetrack could give 
way to a great Olympic city. I have already explained this to the mayor. It rests on the city to 
decide (Nuzman, 2002). 
The decision for Barra was also pragmatically defended by Maia: 
Barra represents the idea of one single signature. All it takes is one signature from the mayor to 
define everything. In Fundão decisions depend on the president, the education minister, the 
chancĞůůŽƌ ?ƚŚĞĚĞĂŶ ?ƚŚĞŵĂǇŽƌ ? (Ventura and Araújo, 1997:C6) 
Secondly, it was understood that the city had to prove itself in organizing other events before preparing 
another Olympic bid. Following the advice of IOC president Juan Antonio Samaranch attention was set on 
the regional Pan American Games, to which a bid was launched and awarded in 2002 (Anon, 2000). As 
championed by Nuzman the new sports venues were to be located at the Jacarepaguá racetrack where a 
nearby gated development project would serve as accommodation for athletes. Soon after the Pan 
American Sports Organization (PASO) awarded the Pan American Games to Rio, the city announced a new 
Olympic bid for the 2012 Games. The Pan American Games would thus serve as a two-step strategy with 
the planned venues reappraised to conform to the IOC requirements. The construction of an Olympic 
stadium was announced on rail yards in the northern neighbourhood of Engenho de Dentro along with 
rescaled projects for an aquatics centre, velodrome and sports arena at Barra. 
At this stage Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, from the opposition Workers ?WĂƌƚǇ ?Wd ? ?ǁĂƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ of 
Brazil. A dedicated Ministry of Sports was established and the president fully endorsed the new bid. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ZŝŽ ?ƐKůǇŵƉŝĐĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞcut short once again in the application phase as the candidature 
did not achieve a sufficient score in the technical evaluation, particularly in the items of transport, 
accommodation, safety and security (IOC, 2004). Despite the setback, the federal government was 
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞWĂŶ ? ? ? ?ZŝŽǁŽƵůĚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƵŶĞƋƵŝǀŽĐĂůƉƌŽŽĨŽĨŝƚƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞĂ
ŐƌĞĂƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǀĞŶƚ ? ?^ŽƵǌĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?/ŶĚĞĞĚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨĞĚĞƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞŵŽƌĞ
than a symbolic gesture as the soaring costs of the preparation for the Pan American Games were 
ĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚǇ ?ƐďƵĚŐĞƚ ?WůĂŶƐƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĂŶĚĞǆƚĞŶĚƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚŶĞƚǁŽƌŬǁĞƌĞ
discarded and the project became essentially venue-oriented while running out of time. Rescued by 
federal aid the preparations were completed just in time for the start of the event to which the general 
public responded well with good attendance to the competitions while being praised by the IOC. The 
retooled Olympic strategy started to bear fruits giving confidence to its promoters to move to their next 
objective.  
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Winning the 2016 Olympic bid 
A few weeks after hosting the 2007 Pan American Games, an official bid application was submitted to the 
IOC. The planning concept considered the master plan of the Pan American Games as a base line to further 
develop the Jacarepaguá racetrack with new facilities that would in effect bring the motorsport activities 
to an end. A compact Games with all competitions held in the city and with most venues located at Barra 
was one of the strongest planning selling points of the candidature.  
Parallel to these initial steps the city hall was going through the decennial review discussions of its 
statutory master plan, the Plano Diretor. A significant outcome of this process was the definition of macro 
ǌŽŶĞƐ ƚŽ ŝŶĨŽƌŵ ƵƌďĂŶ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ? ZŝŽ ?Ɛ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ǁĂƐ ĚŝǀŝĚĞĚ ŝŶto four macro 
ǌŽŶĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƌŽƵŐŚůǇ ŵĂƚĐŚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂů ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĐĂů ĂƌĞĂƐ P ƚŚĞ ^ŽƵƚŚ ŶĚ ǁŚĞƌĞdevelopment 
should be controlled due to the compactness and maturity of its built up area; the West End where there 
was a growth of deprived neighbourhoods which should be assisted; the North End which was longer 
established and yet had great levels of deprivation and where development should be encouraged; and 
finally the Barra region whose real estate speculation should be conditioned by public and private 
investments in infrastructure (PCRJ, 2011).  
When juxtaposed the Olympic master plan and the city statutory master plan were in conflict. Barra was 
the preferential destination of investments in infrastructure while the Deodoro region in the West End 
would be the secondary Olympic cluster and existing stadia were to be used in the North End. An initial 
animosity took place between the city planning department and the technical team of the bid committee. 
This was reconciled by reviewing the location of some venues, albeit these were rather modest such as 
the use of the Sambadrome for the archery competitioŶ Žƌ ƚŚĞ ƐƉŽŶƐŽƌ ?Ɛ ǀŝůůĂŐĞ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƌƚ ĂƌĞĂ ?
Nevertheless, the Olympic bid offered a window of opportunity for pending works and projects developed 
ďǇƚŚĞŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚǇ ?ƐƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚƐƚĂĨĨƐƵĐŚĂƐrainwater reservoirs for flood control and the 
implementation of a network of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridors. The final Olympic master plan proposed 
in the bid book was not as compact and less reliant on large-scale works as its promoters would have liked 
but rather than compromising the city ?Ɛ chances, the foreign consultants advising the candidature saw 
the mediation between the needs of the mega-events and public policies as an appealing sales pitch. 
The role of external consultants during the candidature was an important one (see Oliveira, 2015). Since 
the Pan American Games experts involved with the Sydney 2000 Games had been advising the planning 
and organization of the sports events. In these years, the gap between candidate cities to satisfy standard 
requirements for the Olympic Games became narrower while marketing and communications played an 
increasing role (Payne, 2009). The Rio de Janeiro candidature spared no expenses in hiring some of the 
most sought-after marketing and public relations consultants of the mega-event industry. Consultants 
fresh from the winning London 2102 bid such as communications director Mike Lee, and former IOC 
insiders such as former secretary general Francoise Zweifel and previous marketing director Michael 
WĂǇŶĞĐƌĂĨƚĞĚƚŚĞďŝĚǁŝƚŚĂ ‘ĐůĞĂƌǀŝƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞKůǇŵƉŝĐDŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?WĂǇŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Finally, the Rio bid was set against a favourable political and economic context in contrast with the 2004 
candidature. The bid was fully supported by the three levels of government and the international presence 
and reputation of President Lula contributed to the promotion of the bid. In the second half of the 2000s 
the Brazilian economy was experiencing high rates of growth and the discovery of a large oil basin off Rio 
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ĚĞ:ĂŶĞŝƌŽ ?ƐĐŽĂƐƚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌďŽŽƐƚĞĚĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƚŚĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƌĂǌŝůǁĂƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚĂƐŚŽƐƚŽĨ
the FIFA 2014 WorůĚ ƵƉ ďƵƚ ƚŚŝƐ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ƐĞĞŵ ƚŽ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ZŝŽ ?Ɛ ĐŚĂŶĐĞƐ ĂƐ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ďŽŽŬŵĂŬĞƌƐ
pointed to ZŝŽĂƐĂůŝŬĞůǇĐŽŶƚĞŶĚĞƌŽŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŽĨ/K ?ƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŝŶĞŶŵĂƌŬ ?dŚĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵǁĂƐŚŝŐŚůǇ
favourable and press coverage positive, as argued by strategic adviser Michael Payne (2009), noting that 
 ‘ďǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƚŚĞ/KǁĂƐƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŽŽƉĞŶŚĂŐĞŶ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƐƉƌĞƐƐǁĞƌĞƌƵŶŶŝŶŐŚĞĂĚůŝŶĞƐ ‘dŚĞZŝƐĞĂŶĚ
ZŝƐĞŽĨƌĂǌŝů P&ĂƐƚĞƌ ?^ƚƌŽŶŐĞƌ ?,ŝŐŚĞƌ ? ?dŚĞŚŽƐƚŝŶŐƌŝŐŚƚƐĂǁĂƌĚĞĚƚŽZŝŽŽŶ ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ?ŽƉĞŶĞĚĂ
seven-year period of preparatory works which would intensely impact upon the lives of the  ‘cariocas ? ?ĂƐ
residents of Rio are known). 
 
Producing the Olympic city  
The preparations for the 2016 Olympic Games are taking place in a particular context for Rio de Janeiro 
which overlaps and intersects with other unfolding processes. As noted earlier, the award was parallel to 
economic growth which in combination with fiscal and distribution policies stimulated employment and 
consumption levels. Locally, Rio was impacted by the growth of the oil and gas industry with the 
installation of new national and foreign companies. It is also important to note the security policy 
implemented by the state of Rio which has ended the presence of armed groups at some favelas. Finally, 
the city also played a key role in the hosting of the 2014 World Cup with seven matches including the final 
played at Maracanã stadium. Altogether these processes help to explain the hike in local prices, especially 
in real estate where house prices increased by 227% between January 2010 and May 2015 making Rio the 
most expensive city in the country (Fipe Zap, 2015). In the sections below analysis is turned to those items 
more directly attributed to the 2016 event and where urban, social and environmental impacts have been 
most noticeable. 
Master plan and Olympic venues 
The Olympic master plan presents the organization of competitions in four cluster areas around the city 
(figure 2) which suggests a balanced distribution between the North, South, West and Barra regions. 
However, the concentration of competitions and the extent of urban interventions vary considerably 
among them. In the Copacabana zone, where the main tourist district is located, interventions will have a 
minimal impact. The outdoor competitions of rowing, beach volleyball and triathlon will use existing and 
ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ĨĂĐŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ĨĂŵĞĚ ďĞĂĐŚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŵŽƵŶƚĂŝŶƐ ĂƐ Ă ďĂĐŬĚƌŽƉ ? ŶŽƚŚĞƌ ǌŽŶĞ
encompasses the stadia of Maracanã, recently revamped for the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and the Olympic 
Stadium at Engenho de Dentro, built for the 2007 Pan American Games. A novel feature in the history of 
the Olympics will be the organization of the opening and closing ceremonies at a different stadium than 
where the athletics track and field competitions will be held. In reality it is in the zones of Deodoro and 
Barra that substantial processes of urban change have been triggered. 
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Figure 2. The Olympic clusters of the Rio 2016 Games (Rio de Janeiro City Council). 
Deodoro, in the city ?Ɛ West End, presents the case of an isolated site where interventions are essentially 
ad hoc. In fact, the Olympic facilities will be located within Vila Militar, a planned community of the 
Brazilian Army. Military facilities will be used for the shooting and equestrian competitions while training 
grounds will give way to the hockey and rugby arenas. These facilities are mostly existing and temporary 
and will not produce major changes in the area. In contrast, land belonging to the Brazilian Army will be 
transformed into the X-Park, where a new parkland dedicated to the practice of extreme sports is planned. 
The site will make use of the BMX tracks and the canoe slalom facility built for the Games. It has been 
ƚŝƉƉĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŝůůďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚůĂƌŐĞƐƚƉĂƌŬĂŶĚŚĞůƉƚŽ ‘ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞůŽĐĂůǇŽƵŶŐƐƚĞƌƐ ?ƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚƐ
ĨŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚƐƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?WZ: ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?EĞǁƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚůŝŶŬƐǁŝůů ŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽŽƚŚĞƌ
parts of the city although it is yet to be known the impact caused by the new flyovers and expressways 
running through the neighbouring area of Magalhães Bastos (Davies, 2014). 
On the other hand, the Barra zone will be the centrepiece of the Games where 16 competitions will be 
held. As argued earlier, it is an area of strong real estate speculation and where post event plans have 
been most clearly defined. The Olympic Park is being developed on the former site of a Formula 1 circuit 
in a peninsula on the Jacarepaguá lagoon. It will house nine sports arenas which will stage the 
competitions of gymnastics, swimming, cycling, tennis, basketball, handball, fencing, wrestling and 
taekwondo, apart from the broadcasting and media centres. The avoidance of expensive and unused 
venues has been a constant presence in the public discourse and provisions have been accommodated to 
guarantee the post-event use of the arenas. The most interesting cases are those of the handball arena 
and the aquatics centre, both temporary facilities developed with consideration for their after use. The 
venues will be disassembled after the event and reassembled as public schools and public swimming 
pools.  
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The Olympic Park is being developed via a public-private partnership where a consortium of developers is 
responsible for the delivery of part of the venues and related infrastructure. After the event 75% of the 
land of the Olympic Park will be transferred to developers to give way to private housing, office towers, 
hotels and shopping malls. The remaining 25% is where the permanent facilities will be located, to be 
transformed after the Games into an Olympic Training Centre run by the BOC for the use of elite athletes 
(figure 3). It is still unclear how the centre will be funded and managed and given the underuse and poor 
maintenance of the venues built for the 2007 Pan American Games concerns are justified (Guerra, 2015). 
 
Figure 3. Master Plans of the Olympic Park for the Games and for the post-event phase                          
(Rio de Janeiro City Council) 
The Olympic Village is being developed next to the Olympic Park, a task given to the private sector with 
ĂŶ ‘ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ ? ?ZŝŽ ? ? ? ?ďŝĚĚŝŶŐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ&ĞĚĞƌĂů
Savings Bank. The project envisions the construction of 31 towers of 17 stories each totalling 3,604 units 
to accommodate 18,000 athletes and team members. After the Games the site will become the complex 
of gated communities Ilha Pura ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚĂƐĂŶĞǁ ‘ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŐŽŽĚƚĂƐƚĞ ?
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ůƵǆƵƌǇĂŶĚƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?/ůŚĂWƵƌĂ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚůĞƚĞƐǁŝůůĂůƐŽmake use of training grounds at the adjacent 
ƚŚůĞƚĞ ?ƐWĂƌŬĂŶĚŽĨĂƉƌŝǀĂƚĞďĞĂĐŚ ?ĂƚĂĐŽƌĚŽŶĞĚ-off area on Reserva beach. 
The confidence in the market to repeat the feat of the Pan American Village as expressed in the bid book 
has floundered so far. Whereas all the accommodation units of the 2007 event were sold within 10 hours 
of their release demand has been slow for the initial sales of the Olympic Village, mirroring the slowdown 
of demand for real estate and of the Brazilian economy since 2014 (Anon, 2015b).  
As a result of being the main Olympic cluster, Barra is the focus of much of the public policies and private 
investment. Reviewed planning restrictions have allowed the construction of taller Olympic-related 
housing and hotels. In the post-event scenario access to the region will be significantly improved with 
extended metro lines, duplicated highways and the new BRT corridors linking Barra to the city centre and 
the international airport.  
Governance and budget  
The bidding campaign emphasized the alliance and full support of the three levels of government and the 
sizeable funding earmarked for the delivery of the Games. The election of Eduardo Paes as mayor in 2008 
reproduced at the local scale the political alliance between his party, the PMDB, and PT found at the 
federal and state government levels. This was portrayed as an unprecedented alignment capable of 
overcoming usual personal and party feuds and bureaucratic barriers. While indeed it seemed to facilitate 
the speeding up of some projects (such as the waterfront regeneration discussed below) the definition of 
the governance structure for the delivery of the Games was contested and slow to be resolved. 
Initially it was proposed to create a body along the lines of the Olympic Delivery Authority responsible for 
the London 2012 Games. The Olympic Public Authority (APO) would be a public consortium formed by the 
federal, state and municipal governments with centralized powers to deliver the infrastructure and 
services necessary for the organization of the event (the non-OCOG attributes). However, institutional 
conflict over responsibilities and legal obstacles to ensure complete powers weakened the remit of APO. 
While the approval of the institution at the federal level was delayed, the municipality decided to create 
its own delivery authority, the Municipal Olympic Company (EOM). In this dual institutional arrangement 
both bodies are nominally credited with delivering the Games. In practice, EOM operates as the main 
delivery body, especially after projects under the responsibility of the federal and the state governments 
were devolved to the municipality, such as the Olympic Park and the Deodoro sports complex. In the end 
Mayor Paes efforts to be the poster child of the event prevailed while APO has the role of reporting on 
the federal government activities and the consolidated budget. 
ZŝŽ ?ƐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚƵƌĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ'ĂŵĞƐĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚĐŽƐƚĂƚŽƚĂůŽĨh^ ? ? ? ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶƐƉůŝƚ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ KK' ?Ɛ ďƵĚŐĞƚfor staging the Games (USD 2.82 billion) and the non-OCOG budget for 
delivering the related infrastructure and services (USD 11.6 billion) (Rio 2016 Bid Committee, 2009b). This 
was the highest budget of all candidate cities but promotional material stresseĚƌĂǌŝů ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐĚƵƌŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĂů ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ƐŵĂůů ŝƐůĂŶĚ ŝŶ ĂŶ ŽĐĞĂŶ ŽĨ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?  ?DŝŶŝƐƚĠƌŝŽ ĚŽ
Esporte, 2009:100). Strong emphasis was put on the earmarked national infrastructural budget of USD 
240 billion from which the Games would draw (Rio 2016 Bid Committee, 2009a:35). 
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The total costs updated one year prior to the start of the event amount to an increase of 34% of the 
original budget, excluding service expenditures such as security, educational programs and fan zones 
(APO, 2015a; 2015b). Mayor Paes explained that the total costs could in fact only be possible to be known 
after the staging of the event (Dolzan, 2015). It was decided to further split the non-OCOG budget in two 
categories. The Responsibility Matrix lists all the structural projects directly related to the Games under 
the remit of each government level. This includes the construction and reform of venues, temporary 
installations, infrastructure and equipment. The second category is the Public Policies Plan, also referred 
to as the Legacy Plan, which includes expenditure on mobility, urban regeneration and environmental 
programs understood to have been fast tracked as a result of hosting of the event. This separate category 
is aimed at giving more evidence to projects to be considered as legacies of the event (Table 1).  
Table 1. Rio 2016 budget estimates (BRL million) 
Expenditures Estimates 2015 Source of Funding 
OCOG budget 7,400 Self-financed 
Responsibility Matrix 6,608  
Olympic Village 2,909.5 Private 
Olympic Park (ppp) 1,678.0 PPP 
Olympic Park (public) 730.1 Federal and municipal 
Deodoro sports complex 832.4 Federal  
Sambodromo 65.0 Private and Municipal 
Golf course 60.0 PPP 
Marina da Gloria 60.0 Private 
Olympic stadium 52.3 Municipal 
Athlete's park 40.3 Municipal 
Power/Electricity Infrastructure 180.4 Federal 
Legacy Plan 24,106  
Metro Line 4 8,791 State 
Porto Maravilha 8,200 PPP 
BRT 2,373 Municipal 
Environmental programs 1,628 State, municipal and private 
Light railway 1,189 Federal and private 
Roads 974 Municipal 
Urban renewal 695 Federal and municipal 
Guanabara Bay cleaning program 114 State 
Doping control laboratory 110 Federal 
Social programs 31 Federal 
Total 38,114  
Source: Olympic Public Authority, 2015a; 2015b. 
Obs.: The announced budget has yet to confirm expenditures in security and other services while some projects in 
the responsibility matrix and legacy plan  W such as the reform of train stations, the Maracanazinho arena and the 
rowing stadium  W are awaiting definition. 
 Olympic promoters refute criticism against the Olympic budget by citing statistics of the participation of 
the private sector. Accordingly, some 60% of the costs are covered by private funding (APO, 2015a; 
2015b). These are largely represented by the construction of the Olympic Village, the new golf course and 
the public-private partnerships behind the construction of the Olympic Park and the regeneration 
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ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƌƚĂƌĞĂ ?ĞƐƉŝƚĞďĞŝŶŐƚŽƵƚĞĚĂƐĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐ ‘ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƚĂƐŝŶŐůe cent from the 
ƉƵďůŝĐ ƉƵƌƐĞ ?  ?ƌŝƚŽ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ĨƌŽŵ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞƌƐ ǁĂƐ ŽŶůǇ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ
restrictions and the transfer of land ownership. In all cases floor-area ratios were changed to allow taller 
buildings to be erected. At the Olympic Park where land ownership of the previous racetrack belonged to 
the municipality, 78% will be transferred to the private partner to explore commercial activities including 
private housing, hotels and shopping malls. The compensation and relocation of the evicted families living 
next to the Park in Vila Autódromo and the construction of a new racetrack at a protected green field site 
in Deodoro are both actually existing costs resulting from the destruction of the Jacarepaguá racetrack. 
However, they are not included in the Olympic budget and stand as reminders of the need for close 
scrutiny and inclusion of the social and environmental costs. 
Figure 4. Aerial view of the Olympic Park as of May 2015. Vila Autódromo can be seen in the bottom 
right (Renato Sette Camara / Rio de Janeiro City Council). 
Security and safety  
/KĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨZŝŽ ?ƐKůǇŵƉŝĐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚƵƌĞƐĂůůŶŽƚĞĚƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĂŶĚƐĂĨĞƚǇĂƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ
consistently achieved low scores in relation to other bidding cities (IOC, 1997; 2004; 2008). Responses 
have invariably made reference to the absence of terrorist activities in the country and to the fact that 
the hosting of the UN Earth Summit in 1992 occurred with no incidents (Rio 2016 bid committee, 2009)  W 
when a tight security operation was carried out epitomized by the presence of tanks on the streets of Rio. 
More recently, an extensive security program has been introduced, which despite not being designed in 
response to the hosting of mega-events has become closely implicated with it. 
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Starting in December 2008 the Pacifying Police Unit (UPP) program has sought to take territorial control 
of favelas from organized criminal groups with the installation of police stations and implementing 
community policing and public infrastructure (Freeman, . Prior announcement of an intervention seeks to 
influence drug gangs to leave the area thus avoiding armed conflicts with the arrival of the elite police 
forces. By the summer of 2015 some 40 favelas had been targeted and a sensible reduction of violent 
crimes occurred in the first four years of the program (Cano, Borges and Ribeiro, 2012).  
However, as Cano et al (2012) have noted the selection of favelas was not supported by indicators such 
as crime statistiĐƐ ? ZĂƚŚĞƌ ? ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ŚŝŐŚůǇ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ďĞůƚ ? ĂƌŽƵŶĚ ƚŚĞ DĂƌĂĐĂŶĆ
ƐƚĂĚŝƵŵ ĂŶĚ ŶĞĂƌ ŽƚŚĞƌ KůǇŵƉŝĐ ĂŶĚ ƚŽƵƌŝƐƚƐ ƐŝƚĞƐ ? ƚŚƵƐ  ‘ŝŐŶŽƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ǀŝŽůĞŶƚ ĂƌĞĂƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
metropolitan region, which are the Baixada Fluminense and the North End of ZŝŽ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? ?WŽůŝĐĞŵĞŶŚĂǀĞ
also confirmed in interviews that the hosting of the World Cup and the Olympics were determinants in 
guiding decisions over the expansion of UPP operations (Vigna, 2013; Negreiros, 2014). Recent escalating 
violence and police ĂďƵƐĞĂƚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂĐŝĨŝĞĚĨĂǀĞůĂƐ ?ŚĂƐŵĂĚĞƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐĚŽƵďƚĨƵůŽĨƚŚĞůŽŶŐĞǀŝƚǇ
of the program after the event (Puff, 2013; 2014). 
Responsibility for security during the Games will be shared between the organizing committee, the federal 
Extraordinary Secretariat of Security for Major Events, and the Ministry of Defense. While the former two 
will coordinate operations at the venues and in the city supplemented with private security (Werneck and 
Maltchik, 2015), the latter is responsible for equipping the territory against potential threats. The defense 
strategy includes the hiring of fighter aircrafts from the Swedish government and missile systems from 
Russia (Batista, 2015; Anon, 2015a). 
Mobility 
ZŝŽ ?ƐŐƌŽǁƚŚhas always been dictated by overcoming its challenging landscape and the expansion of the 
transport network played a vital part in pushing the city limits. As noted earlier, just as electric tramways 
opened the seafront of the South End for the carioca elite, working class neighbourhoods were established 
along the railways cutting through the North End and the Baixada Fluminense region. In the 1970s the 
marshlands of Barra da Tijuca represented a new frontier after the gradual development of Copacabana, 
Ipanema, Leblon and São Conrado. Consistent with the planning rationale developed for Brasilia, planner 
Lucio Costa devised the organization of new neighbourhoods along expressways and the primacy of the 
individual motor vehicle.  
Between 1991 and 2010 the population residing in the Barra region grew from 526,302 to 909,955 (IPP, 
2001). Encircled by mountain chains, access to the rest of the city was possible via the coastline and 
through the valley north of Jacarepaguá but by the 1990s traffic flow was already saturated. Having Barra 
as the main stage of the Games suggested that improved access to the area and transportation was 
another theme in ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĐŝƚǇƚƌĂŝůĞĚďĞŚŝŶĚŽƚŚĞƌďŝĚƐ ?dŚĞ ? ? ? ?ďŝĚƉƌŽŵŝƐĞĚƚŚĞĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘,ŝŐŚ
WĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞdƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚZŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨƚŚĞZdƐǇƐƚem as a feasible way to connect 
the four Olympic clusters and deliver a new transport network in time for the event (Rio 2016 OCOG, 
2009). 
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Barra acts as the nodal point of the three segregated bus corridors tied to the Olympic deadline. Totalling 
117 kilometres they consist of the Transoeste corridor linking Barra to the West End and a new metro 
terminal; the Transcarioca line, which cuts through the North End towards the international airport; and 
the Transolimpica, linking the Olympic Park with Deodoro.  
Proponents of the BRT system, such as former Bogotá mayor Enrique Peñalosa who became a global 
advocate of the policy, argue that it represents the only viable transport solution in terms of scale and 
cost for large cities in the Global South (Peñalosa, 2013). It is presented as a compromise between the 
lower costs of surface systems and the operation and comfort of underground. Critics on the other hand, 
point to the marginalization of metro and rail expansion and that the system presents only temporary 
results as it can saturate quickly. The experience of the Transoeste and Transcarioca corridors already in 
operation seem to corroborate the latter argument. Press coverage of the systems inaugurated in 2012 
and 2014 respectively document overcrowding and safety worries as routine occurrences (Victor and 
Ribeiro, 2015; França, 2015). 
Figure 5. The new BRT system of segregated bus lanes were devised to connect the Olympic clusters and 
the international airport and stand as the transport legacy of the 2016 Games (Renato Sette Camara / 
Rio de Janeiro City Council). 
The Olympic Transport Ring also envisioned expanded metro lines and upgraded rail services. The 
construction of the metro line 4 is the most expensive project associated with the Games consuming 23% 
of the total budget at a 2015 updated cost of BRL 8,8 billion (APO, 2015). It will extend the service running 
along the South End coastline for 16 kilometres with six new stations reaching Barra da Tijuca at its eastern 
point in substitution to a previously planned BRT corridor (Rio 2016 OCOG, 2009). Finally, it was also 
ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĂŝůƐǇƐƚĞŵǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇƌĞŶŽǀĂƚĞĚŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĚĞůŝǀĞƌĂ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ-ĐůĂƐƐ ?ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ
to the densely populated areas in the North and West regions (Rio 2016 Olympic Bidding Committee, 
2009). After reaching a peak of 1 million day riders at the beginning of the 1980s the service currently 
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carries around 620,000 passengers every day with frequent problems of disrupted services and 
overcrowding (SupervIa, 2015; Souza, 2014). Olympic-related investments promised to  ‘drastically focus 
on changing both the image and the effectiveness of the railway, upgrading stations, fully modernizing 
the rolling stock, upgrading infrastructure and systems, and improving maintenĂŶĐĞ ǁŽƌŬƐ ?  ?Rio 2016 
OCOG, 2009:26).  
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŽŶůǇƚŚĞƌĞĨƵƌďŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨƐŝǆƌĂŝůƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐƐĞƌǀŝŶŐKůǇŵƉŝĐǀĞŶƵĞƐǁĞƌĞŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘>ĞŐĂĐǇ
WůĂŶ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƵƉŐƌĂĚŝŶŐǁŽƌŬƐƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŽƌ ?ƌĞĐĞŶƚ
change in the terms of the contract transferred the refurbishment of the stations to the private operator 
and a consequential reduction in the number of carriages to be purchased (Nogueira, 2015). The reviewed 
agreement evidences the marginalization of improvements in the areas of highest demand for public 
transports. The new BRT corridors and the expanded metro network will significantly improve transport 
connections in the region of Barra but substantially improved services for the commuters based in the 
North and Baixada Fluminense areas  W the latter responsible for a ridership of 2 million passengers daily 
to Rio (Observatório Sebrae, 2013) W will have to wait for the time being.  
Environment  
dŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƐƚŐĂŵďůĞŽĨZŝŽ ?ƐKůǇŵƉŝĐ-dependent program of interventions was the cleaning-up of the 
waters of Guanabara Bay in order to offer optimal conditions for the sailing competitions. Water pollution 
has grown exponentially since the 1960s due to industrial activity and the discharge of raw sewage from 
the 16 municipalities of the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan Region on the shores of the bay. The Olympic bid 
set out the objective to treat 80% of the sewage by 2016 but recent figures suggest a more modest 
outcome. 
A state-led sanitation plan has been in place since 1995 but it has been marred by the lack of coordination 
among stakeholders and funding discontinuities, and by 2007 it presented a level of 12% of treated 
sewage (Werneck, 2012; Rio 2016 OCOG, 2014; Neves, 2015). Thus the hosting of the Games presented 
the opportunity to leverage funding and efforts to accelerate the sanitation policy and improve 
environmental conditions for the population of 8,5 million. Despite showing progress leading to the 
treatment of 50% of sewage in 2013 (Rio 2016 OCOG, 2014), in the selection of public policies for the 
 ‘>ĞŐĂĐǇWůĂŶ ?ĂŵŽĚĞƐƚƐĞƚŽĨƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ ƚŽƚĂůůŝŶŐBRL 124.67 million  W 0.3% of the total budget  W was 
included (Konchinski, 2014b). They related to sewerage works in the central Rio area, river barriers and 
collecting barges. The latter two are mitigation efforts to avoid floating garbage near the competition 
areas while post-event targets remain uncertain. 
Reviewed targets also compromised the reforestation pledge to compensate for carbon emission resulting 
from works for the Games. After expanding the original plan of planting 24 million trees to a further 10 
million, a readjusted figure of merely 8.1 million was announced (Konchinski, 2015). The figure contrasts 
with the deforestation of 270 square meters of Atlantic rainforest for the construction of the 
Transolímpica corridor and the duplication of the Joá elevated express way (Konchinski, 2014a).  
Finally, the construction of the Olympic golf course has also been responsible for the loss of natural 
environment. The sport, alongside rugby, was included in the Games by the IOC after candidate cities had 
concluded their final proposals. The Rio de Janeiro Olympic golf course will be located on the shores of 
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the Marapendi Lagoon in Barra in an area previously protected as a natural site. Alleging financial and 
logistics reasons for not using the two existing private golf clubs, the municipality partnered with the 
private developer owning land north of the preservation area to build a course from scratch (PCRJ, 2015). 
According to the terms of the PPP the developer is responsible for the construction and maintenance costs 
of the venue. In return the municipality reviewed planning restrictions to allow taller luxury buildings to 
be built on the private land. After the event the venue will be operated as a public golf course for a period 
of 20 years before returning to the private owner (PCRJ, 2015).   
Urban regeneration  
The largest regeneration project linked with the Olympics is located 30km away from the Olympic Park 
right at the port area next to the city centre. The Porto Maravilha program aims to regenerate 5 million 
square meters of docklands, rail yards and warehouses into a new mixed-use neighbourhood. Signature 
buildings by some of the stars of the architecture system such as Santiago Calatrava and Norman Foster 
are profoundly changing the waterfront landscape with office towers, residential condos, museums, an 
aquarium and a renewed public space. Despite not featuring any prominent Olympic facility the program 
is being heralded as the main legacy of the Games. 
The inadequacies of the port to adapt to the new container technology since the 1960s and the 
construction of the new Port of Itaguaí in 1982 led to the decline of activities and to the dereliction of 
buildings. Plans for urban renewal have come in succession but were barred by conflicting public interests, 
institutional resistance on the part of the port authority, and insufficient demand from private investors. 
The announcement of the program came shortly before the award in Copenhagen in a press conference 
ǁŝƚŚZŝŽ ?ƐŵĂǇŽƌ ?ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĂǌŝůŝĂŶƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?/ ƐŝŐŶĂůůĞĚƚŚĂƚũŽŝŶƚŝŶƚĞƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůefforts 
would finally make the policy happen. 
Where previous plans failed to progress from the study phase or producing minor interventions, the 
announcement of Porto Maravilha took place in very favourable circumstances³. First, political alignments 
facilitated negotiations and in this case the release of land belonging to the three levels of government. 
Second, the strong growth of the Brazilian economy in the latter half of the 2000s, and of Rio in particular, 
created a strong demand for office space. The growth of the oil and gas industry with the discovery of 
new deep-sea basins was an important factor pushing corporate demand for new office space in Rio. 
Third, new planning instruments regulated in 2001 enabled the implementation of self-financed 
regeneration schemes. The Urban Operations instrument foresees public capture of planning gain by 
selling additional building rights to erect taller buildings to developers and the money re-invested in the 
regeneration of the area. Fourth, was the interest and lobbying of four of the largest Brazilian construction 
companies which produced the feasibility plan for the regeneration program and won the bid for 
engineering works and provision of services. Finally, was the momentum given by the hosting of the 
incoming mega-ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚZŝŽ ?ƐǀŝƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƉƵƐŚĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĂƐƚ-tracked approval 
of by-laws and planning permissions.  
Despite presenting conditions to be developed independently of the Olympic project the association with 
the Games is strategic in a number of ways. In aligning the project with the Olympic deadline it reassures 
investors about the completion of infrastructural works. Since launch it has resulted in the demolition of 
an elevated express way and its substitution by an underground tunnel, the upgrading of electricity, 
18 
 
sanitation and telecommunications structures, new roads and renewed sidewalks and urban furniture. It 
also enabled the municipality to leverage federal funding to implement a new light railway system. Finally, 
the scale of the project, the confidence in the market demands and the private financial resources of the 
PPP supported the discourse of a profound urban change. Its inclusion in the Legacy Plan, considerably 
boosts the legacy itself and the share of private funding. 
The program has the potential to contribute positively to the regeneration of a central and historical area, 
opening up new public spaces and cultural facilities while attracting new businesses. However, there is 
the danger for it to become a corporate ghetto and to induce the gentrification of nearby neighbourhoods, 
some of the few low-income areas close enough to the Centro job market. So far most of the announced 
developments have consisted of office towers and corporate hotels. The valorisation of land is a 
consequence of regeneration schemes, and more so in property-led projects such as Porto Maravilha. 
Social impacts can be mitigated by public policies and there is an attempt to moderate such outcomes in 
the City Statute by requesting local government to address the economic and social needs of residents 
impacted directly by Urban Operations. In this sense there was an expectation of new social housing to 
be included in the program, especially because all the building rights were bought by the Federal Savings 
Bank, a state institution that is also responsible for financing social housing in the country. However, only 
a limited number of restored houses have been converted into social housing. Residential development 
for the middle class has also been slow to be announced raising doubts about the ability to avoid the 
empty streets in out-of-office hours seen in the ZŝŽ ?ƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĚŝƐƚƌŝĐƚ ? 
Social impacts  
The history of urban change in Rio have invariably produced substantial costs to the city poor. As saw 
earlier during the Pereira Passos reforms, tenement houses were targeted by the urban interventions 
leading to the displacement of residents to nearby hills and substandard housing along the railway. 
Another period of intense displacement took place in the 1960s during Carlos Lacerda ?Ɛ term of office. His 
pledge for ordering the urban space also translated in the wholesale removal of favelas in the South End 
with families relocated to social housing projects such as Cidade de Deus in the then distant region of 
Barra (Silva, 2004). During the military dictatorship, Negrão de Lima slum clearance program affected 
more than 70,500 people (Valladares in Brum, 2012). This troublesome historical legacy is once again 
repeated with the hosting of the 2016 Games contributing to the displacement of residents of favelas and 
low-income neighbourhoods. 
Social impacts associated with the hosting of major events are extensive and well documented (Ritchie 
and Hall, 1999; Lenskyj, 2002; 2008; Silvestre, 2008; Haynes and Horn, 2011; Minnaert, 2012) with the 
displacement of residents representing the most dramatic impact (Olds, 1998; COHRE, 2007; Porter et al, 
2009; Rolnik, 2009). The preparations for the Rio 2016 Games have accumulated a problematic track 
record in this respect as parts of, or entire, favelas are removed to give way to the works associated with 
the event. Faulhaber and Azevedo (2015) examined all the removal and expropriation decrees during Paes 
government between 2009 and 2012 reaching a figure of 20,229 affected households and an estimate of 
more than 65,000 people. The reasons for displacement included works for the Olympic Park; the BRT 
corridors; works carried by the secretariat of housing and other secretariats; and those considered at risk. 
The figure places Eduardo Paes ? mandate among the ones responsible for the largest number of evictions 
in absolute terms, second only to the aforementioned Negrão de Lima. 
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Figure 6. The favela of Vila do Recreio II was cleared to give way to a BRT corridor. The houses in the 
background belong to the few residents still resisting eviction in May 2011 (Nelma Gusmão de Oliveira). 
 
Figure 7. The map presents the location of favelas expropriated between 2009 and 2013 (in circles) and 
the destination of those accepting relocation to the Minha Casa Minha Vida social housing program, 
largely concentrated in the West End (Lucas Faulhaber). 
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The case of removal is even more dramatic when the experience of those affected is exposed. Silvestre 
and Oliveira (2012) documented the initial cases of displacement caused by works for Transoeste along 
Americas Av. in Barra Region which became standard practice for other removals. After an area is declared 
ĨŽƌ  ‘ƉƵďůŝĐ ƵƚŝůŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ Ă ůŝƐƚ ŽĨ ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚŝĞƐ ŝƐ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ? ĐŝƚǇ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ƉƌŽŵƉƚůǇ ǀŝƐŝƚ Ă ĨĂǀĞůĂ ƚŽ ŝŶĨŽƌŵ
residents of their eviction and to earmark houses for demolition. Residents are oriented to either accept 
financial compensation, which only take the built structure into account, or to be relocated to the housing 
projects of Minha Casa MInha mostly situated ŝŶƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐǁĞƐƚĞƌŶĞĚŐĞ (figure 6), otherwise they risk 
being left empty-handed. Compensation is often insufficient to acquire a similar dwelling, even at local 
favelas, and the move to distant social housing brings financial and social hardship due to added 
ĐŽŵŵƵƚŝŶŐĐŽƐƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂďƌƵƉƚƌƵƉƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůĨĂďƌŝĐ ?dŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚǇ ?ƐŽĨĨĞƌƐ
have their houses immediately cleared leaving remaining residents to live among rubble and litter. Delay 
to compensate or relocate has exposed families to vulnerable situations, having to live with family and 
friends or rendered homeless (Silvestre and Oliveira, 2012). 
Official discourse claims that the removal of the favela of Vila Autódromo is the only case directly linked 
with the Games (Anon, 2012; Rio 2016 OCOG, 2014). It is argued that infrastructure-induced 
displacement, such as the BRT corridors, are the result of policies that would be carried out regardless of 
hosting the event (Rio 2016 OCOG, 2014). Vila Autódromo is located on the edge of the former 
Jacarepaguá circuit initially settled by fishermen in the 1960s and expanded with the arrival of the 
workforce employed for the construction of the same circuit and nearby Riocentro convention centre in 
the following decade. Since the early 1990s the favela has been subject to continuous threats of removal 
despite having their right to stay recognized by the state of Rio in the 1990s, the landowner of the circuit. 
Ownership was transferred to the municipality in 1998 and since then the threats intensified first with the 
hosting of the Pan American Games and finally with the Olympic award. Their singular case among other 
ĨĂǀĞůĂƐ ƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ůŽĐĂů ĂƌĐŚŝƚĞĐƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ƐĐŚŽŽůƐ ƚŽ ŚĞůƉ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ
association to develop a bottom-up alternative proposal (AMPVA, 2012). In demonstrating that the 
upgrading of the favela did not compromise the works for the Olympic Park and that it would cost less 
than the compensation and relocation to another site, the plan won the Deutsche Bank Urban Age Award 
in 2013 (Tanaka, 2014). However, the municipality was adamant in clearing the site which was now 
included in the PPP contract for the development of the Olympic Park. Different reasons ranging from 
exposure to natural hazards (Bastos and Schmidt, 2010); environmental damage (Magalhães, 2011); event 
security (AMPVA, 2012:9); the construction of the MPC (Anon, 2012); the BRT corridor (Tanaka, 2014); 
and the duplication of access roads (Mendonça and Puff, 2015), were alleged at different times without 
fully disclosing details and plans despite public requests. Differently from the options given in other cases, 
relocation was to a housing project 1.5 kilometres away. The six-year intimidation process and 
psychological stress common in other favelas described above led most residents to accept negotiation 
ůĞĂǀŝŶŐĂƐŵĂůůŐƌŽƵƉƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĞŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚǇ ?ƐƉůĂŶ ?Ɛof June 2015 violent clashes with the police 
gained worldwide attention with the remaining residents fighting for their right to stay (Watts, 2015).  
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Conclusion 
This chapter offered a critical analysis of the preparations for the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro. 
The spatial implications of the event were contextualized against a historical background of urban 
interventions and its rationale was traced through the consecutive Olympic bids produced since the 
1990s. This concluding section revisits the opening vignette in an attempt to answer the questions posed.  
In holding the experience of Barcelona 1992 as a reference, it was expected that the hosting of the 
Olympic Games could offer a step change for the city, especially in terms of its urban infrastructure. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨZŝŽ ?ƐďŝĚƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ'ĂŵĞƐĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĞ ůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
Olympic project and the city planning policies in order to, as in the case of its Mediterranean counterpart, 
fast-track urging projects for the city. Resulting from the enthusiasm of the first strategic plan, the 2004 
bid was prepared by foreign experts with carte blanche to propose a plan that could promote effects 
similar to those seen in the Catalan capital. For all its unrealistic ambitions the project was true to its 
intention to distribute benefits more widely. In centring the event in the Fundão Island it was expected 
that the preparation timeframe would have boosted the programs for cleaning the waters of Guanabara 
Bay and the upgrading adjacent slums while leaving a legacy of a recovered waterfront and new and 
renewed facilities for a public university. The reading of the causes of failure in this first attempt served 
to steer the Olympic project in another direction, by choosing Barra da Tijuca as the centrepiece of future 
bids and to move away from the premise of hosting mega-events to promote urban change. The Olympic 
ƉƌŽũĞĐƚďĞĐĂŵĞĂƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐƉůĂŶĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŵĂǇŽƌ ?ƐĂŶĚKĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐƚŽďƵŝůĚƚŚĞĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ
ZŝŽ ?ƐĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚ win the hosting rights of the Games. The construction of sport venues in a peninsula 
isolated from its surroundings for the 2007 Pan American Games produced negligible improvements to 
the city. 
Once Barra was firmly established in the master plan of the Olympic project it served to legitimize public 
policies to an already developed and privileged part of the city despite being in conflict with the general 
ŐƵŝĚĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŝƚǇ ?ƐƐƚĂƚƵƚŽƌǇŵĂƐƚĞƌƉůĂŶ ?/ŵƉƌŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐŽƌŽĂĚĂĐĐĞƐƐ ?ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐĂŶĚ
the extension of the metro network came under the Olympic banner while other programs with the 
potential of promoting wider territorial benefits, such as the upgrading of the rail service and of the 
treatment of raw sewage discharged in the Guanabara Bay were deemed low priorities and their targets 
postponed. The new BRT network, though centred on Barra, takes advantage of previous studies and can 
potentially improve the transport system in the West and North End. However, the initial experience has 
confirmed criticism of rapid saturation and overcrowding. 
Contrasting the current preparations to other rounds of great urban change the revanchist nature of some 
policies reinforces the history of great social burden. For most of the thousands of households evicted 
since 2009 stability and material improvement meant being displaced to the city edges far from the job 
markets and in areas lacking developed infrastructures. It can be argued that it is unrealistic to expect that 
the hosting of a mega-event can serve to resolve deeply embedded social and urban injustices. However, 
just as valid it can serve to exacerbate those injustices, and in the projects carried under its name 
downplay social and environmental costs. 
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Notes 
1. The efforts of Eduardo Paes to measure himself with Pereira Passos is not only rhetoric. Allegedly he 
intended to inaugurate the first phase of works for the regeneration of the port area dressed up in historical 
clothes alluding to Passos. Dissuaded by his staff, an actor posed on his side on the balcony of the Jardins 
do Valongo instead (Tabak, 2012). 
2. As is common practice in this kind of consultancy exercises, stated goals are aspirational and vague making 
obligatory references to city image, competition for investments and quality of life. The objective set for 
Rio was to  ?Make Rio de Janeiro a metropolis with a better quality of life, socially integrated, respecting 
citizenship and confirming its vocation for culture and joie-de-vivre. An enterprising competitive metropolis, 
with capacity to be a center of knowledge and business generation for Brazil, and its privileged connection 
ǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? (PCRJ, 1996: 23). 
 
3. The following observations are based on a current research undertaken by the author on the making and 
delivery of the Porto Maravilha regeneration project. 
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